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Abstract 
The contribution of foreign banks to the development of the financial sectors in emerging markets, and 
especially the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, is well-known. The purpose of this 
article is to focus on an area of foreign bank influence that has thus far only begun to emerge from the 
extant literature: the effect of foreign banks on the broader business environment in transition. In 
addition to improving financial intermediation and broader access to credit, has the presence of 
foreign financial institutions helped to shape a better business environment in the long-run? Or did 
foreign banks retard local institutional development and thus worsen the overall business 
environment? Using cointegration techniques across a sample of 21 diverse transition countries from 
1983 to 2015, I find that foreign bank entry had a positive impact across business environment 
indicators, but with some indicators taking longer to influence than others. The policy implications are 
that business environments can be improved by facilitating foreign bank entry rather than restricting 
it. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The contribution of foreign banks to the development of the financial sectors in emerging 
markets, and especially transition economies, has been well-documented, focusing on the role of 
foreign banks in mitigating financing constraints on firm entry (Ayyagari et al. 2008) or in 
contributing to transition processes in a broader sense (Naaborg et. al, 2004).  While some articles 
have highlighted the danger of foreign banks transmitting financial shocks from developed economies 
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011), for the most part the literature is in agreement that foreign bank entry 
has been a positive phenomenon in the transition from communism to capitalism. 
 
However, the bulk of work done examining the effects of foreign banks in transition has 
focused solely on their financial effects, and less on their institutional impact. The purpose of this 
article is to address this gap in the literature and examine how foreign banks may have contributed to a 
specific facet of transition beyond purely financial matters. Building on an earlier model (Hartwell and 
Michael, 2015), this article will examine the effects of foreign bank entry in transition on the 
development of the business environment in these countries. In addition to improving financial 
intermediation and building financial access where none existed prior to transition, did foreign 
financial institutions also help shape a better business environment in transition economies? Put 
another way, there is ample empirical and theoretical evidence that foreign banks brought in know-
how once they moved into the transition countries of the east, but did they also bring in knowledge of 
how a business environment should be run? This is a plausible question, given that foreign banks are 
often the first foreign firms to move into an emerging market, as was the case in transition; being the 
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first exposure that formerly-communist policymakers encounter, banks thus have a unique ability to 
transmit expectations from foreign businesses on how a business environment should operate. 
 
The novelty of this article in the literature regarding both foreign bank entry and transition 
economics is multi-faceted: in the first instance, there has been little theoretical work done on what are 
the actual determinants of a country business environment. For instance, why does one country have a 
longer waiting time at customs than another, or why is one country perceived as more competitive? 
This article will examine this issue specifically in relation to transition economies, where nearly every 
country began with a tabula rasa business environment and little institutional memory on how to serve 
a customer. Our contribution theoretically is to surmise that a business environment is influenced by 
several factors, including exposure to the outside world, political institutions, macroeconomic 
conditions, and, the subject of this work, exogenous institutional influence. Can the first ‘foreign’ 
institutions entering an economy make a difference on the subsequent path of the business 
environment? 
 
In addition, there is also little theoretical or empirical work done on how foreign banks can 
influence the environment around them beyond merely facilitating credit. This article makes a 
contribution to our understanding of how financial institutions can influence other institutions within 
an economy. Finally, research into business environment metrics has often ignored the properties of 
the data, including non-stationarity, a problem plaguing recent attempts in this area (a glaring issue in 
Kouretas and Tsournas 2016); this article attempts to rectify this gap through the application of 
cointegration techniques to understand the true long-run relationships between foreign bank entry and 
the business environment in transition. 
 
The rest of the article as is as follows: the next section examines the admittedly scarce 
literature surrounding foreign bank entry and a country’s business environment, while Section 3 sets 
up the model and estimation strategy. Section 4 offers the results, and Section 5 concludes with some 
policy recommendations.  
 
 
2. Literature and theory 
 
A country’s business environment is regarded as a sub-set of the broader “investment climate” 
that prevails within an economy, with the business environment defined as the legislation, regulation, 
and administration surrounding starting and operating a private-sector business. While the conception 
of business environment has become standard in economic policymaking, international technical 
assistance, and even in economics research (Djankov et al. 2002 setting the tone), there is however a 
dearth of research on the determinants of an effective business environment. Indeed, most work that 
exists in the extant literature focuses on specific facets of the business environment and their 
contribution to broader economic metrics rather than offering a theoretical approach into what factors 
would directly influence a country’s investment climate. A notable exception to this trend comes from 
the OECD (2007), which outlined a basic approach focused more on entrepreneurship than the broader 
business environment. Their model of demand (market opportunities), supply (presence of skills), and 
market mechanisms to mediate supply and demand offers a rudimentary way to understand which 
variables can determine the overall business environments. However, this approach remains in the 
realm of theoretical, with no follow-up work to test this framework. 
 
Given this lack of work on what exactly determines a country business environment, it is little 
wonder that there is no examination on the effects of financial institutions on crafting a country’s 
business environment. Recent research from Asturias et. al (2015) has moved us closer to 
understanding the channels that a foreign bank would utilize to influence the business environment, 
concentrating on the fact that entry barriers and financial frictions are substitutable. Their work shows 
that improvements to the financial system have a larger impact on output when entry costs are high, 
and in many ways, financial sector reform can attain the same effect as removing entry restrictions. 
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However, even this work-in-progress does not explore how one path (improved financial 
intermediation) interacts with the other (reducing barriers to entry).  
 
More specific work from Hartwell and Michael (2015), the direct precursor to this article, 
comes closest to the issue that we are examining, the effect of foreign banks in improving a country 
business environment. Examining a large database of developed and developing countries, they 
develop a thesis that foreign banks can bring in know-how and management techniques that are simply 
absent from their target market, in addition to contributing financial depth, thus improving the 
business environment. Their results show, across a broad swath of business environment metrics, that 
foreign banks do indeed correlate with better business environments, although the biggest gains are in 
areas that generally require financial intermediation. Put another way, foreign banks can directly 
impact the facets of the business environment in a developing country in the sectors where banks are 
present (such as investor protection and cost of trading), with broader business environment metrics 
less affected (such as contract enforcement). This comports with a thesis advanced in Kouretas and 
Tsoumas (2016), that foreign banks may improve risk management and funds availability, an effect 
which would be most pronounced on areas in which banks specialize. 
 
Theoretically, the results that Hartwell and Michael (2015) found for all countries should be 
even more pronounced in the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
former Soviet Union (FSU), where foreign banks filled a large institutional void left after the collapse 
of communism. Having neither a financial system nor a business environment, foreign banks were 
amongst the first foreign institutions to enter the newly-transitioning countries, exposing policymakers 
to “Western” expectations on how business should be conducted. Thus, these institutions would not 
have only had a major effect on the development of financial sectors throughout the region, they also 
could have acted as ambassadors of good practice, transmitting know-how and professionalism that 
translated into better business environments. And as Asturias et. al (2015) surmise, the removal of 
financial frictions may have also encouraged firm entry, which then would feed into more demand for 
business environment improvements.  
 
In sum, the entry of foreign banks into transitional economies may not only have provided the 
effects already noted in the literature, namely access to finance or even better risk-management (or, on 
the negative side, the possibility of importing foreign risk). In the context of an economy that was 
undergoing wide-ranging structural changes, the presence of foreign banks may have also led to more 
efficient business regulations and a transfer of knowledge on the “appropriate” ways in which the 
private and public sectors should have interacted. While these effects were discerned in Hartwell and 
Michael (2015), the impact would likely have been much larger in transition economies. 
 
 
3. The model 
 
3.1 Model and data description 
 
In order to examine the relationship between business environments and foreign bank presence 
in transition, a variety of econometric methods will be utilized. The base model relates a series of 
business environment variables to foreign bank entry: 
 
Yit* = αXit-1 + ρForeignBankt-1 + εit         (1) 
 
Where Y is the specific facet of the business environment in country i, X is a lagged vector of 
macroeconomic and institutional controls, and Foreign Bank is the lagged size of foreign bank claims 
in a given year (taken from the Bank for International Settlements). The lag, at one year, of bank 
claims and all controls is included to alleviate simultaneity issues and hopefully isolate the effects of 
foreign bank presence on the myriad of business environment metrics (although the effects may take 
more than a year to materialize, as will be seen in the regressions below). Given the extremely varying 
scale of the different variables, all are expressed in log form. 
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The Y variables are derived from Hartwell and Michael (2015) and included to encompass a large 
cross-section of the different facets of a country’s business environment. Unlike Kouretas and 
Tsournos (2016), who use a composite index to proxy for the business environment, I use the separate 
indicators to better illuminate the specific channels that a bank operates through. These variables 
include: 
 
• Competitiveness Ranking: From the World Economic Forum’s annual rankings, this number 
captures 12 sub-components and measures competitiveness as the inputs which determine 
productivity in a country.  
• Investor Protection: Obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), this index 
covers three subcomponents (contract viability/expropriation, profit repatriation, and payment 
delays), each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points, for a 
total of 12. Higher numbers correspond to better property rights protection, a key facet of the 
business environment. 
• Days to Start a Business: Taken from the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” rankings, 
this indicator is simply the number of days it takes to open/register a limited liability 
corporation in the largest business city of a particular city (in practice, often the capital city). 
• Time to Export or Import: Recorded in calendar days, these two measures cover how long 
the process for either exporting or importing a container takes throughout document 
preparation, inland transport and handling, customs clearance and inspections, and port and 
terminal handling. 
• Cost to Export or Import: The companion measure to time, the cost of export/import is 
calculated as the fees levied on a 20-foot container, in U.S. dollars. This measure includes all 
fees associated with the four stages of export/import noted in the previous indicator.  
 
Arrayed against these dependent variables, in addition to our metric of interest (foreign bank 
presence) are a series of macroeconomic and country-characteristic controls. However, in the 
economics literature, only Hartwell and Michael (2015) having created a plausible set of 
macroeconomic and policy controls that would account for a country’s business environment. Their 
article examined GDP per capita (following Djankov et al. 2002), population size, openness, inflation, 
and government growth as possible determinants of specific traits of the business environment, 
outlining how each particular variable would affect the various facets of the business environment 
such as time to import or number of days to start a business. Via these controls, they were able to 
cover many of the other possible determinants of business environment outlined above, with GDP 
proxying for general economic health of country, growth of government proxying for government 
size, population size representing inherent transaction costs in a country, and inflation and openness 
acting as a proxy for government policies more generally.  
 
Following on the lead of this earlier work, this current article includes all of these possible 
determinants of business environment success or failure, with the exception of swapping out the 
World Bank’s trade as a percentage of GDP measure for the constructed “openness” ratio that was 
used in the earlier article. Additionally, inflation has been transformed as in Staehr (2005), using a 
logarithmic formulation of log (100 + inflation rate), in order to account for the episodes of 
hyperinflation that took place in transition. More importantly, here we extend the analysis by including 
several additional metrics that could plausibly determine a country’s business environment. In the 
realm of more general controls, we include in this analysis the extent of resource rents in an economy 
as a percentage of GDP, which can create “Dutch Disease” effects and retard development of non-
extractive industries, thus creating a more difficult business environment; this is also the case in many 
transition economies, where extractive industries have come to both dominate the economy (Russia, 
Azerbaijan) as well as creating a powerful vested interest against liberalization. Going in the other 
direction, we also include here gross tertiary enrollment, included to capture human capital effects 
demand for a better business environment. Finally, in terms of macroeconomic controls, included in 
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this revised specification is the net inflow of foreign direct investment, a variable which has been 
shown to have an impact in encouraging business environment reform (Bevan and Estrin 2004).1  
 
As we are focusing on transition countries exclusively, this analysis will also encompass possible 
determinants of business environment that would be specific to a transitioning economy, including: 
democratic change, captured here by the Polity IV “polity2” measure which quantifies the extent of 
political openness and institutional development in a transitioning society. The transition from 
communism to capitalism was not just an economic one, as political institutions also moved from a 
one-party state to pluralism, and this change could have affected the business environment 
developmental path in each country. An expanding voice in the political process could have increased 
the demand for ease of doing business by entrepreneurs, although, conversely, it also could have 
allowed populist policies which are harmful to business (e.g. minimum wage laws or protectionism). 
Finally, although not necessarily specific to transition economies, we have also included the surface 
area of the country as another indicator of size which may capture scale and transport cost effects in a 
different manner than population size. The transition process not only entailed changes of institutions, 
but in many cases changes of borders, with the collapse of the Soviet Union into 15 separate countries, 
the division of Yugoslavia into six (and eventually seven) new countries, and the peaceful divorce of 
Czechoslovakia into two separate polities.   
 
The data utilized in this article covers 21 transition economies on an annual basis over the period 
1983-2015 (the ICRG investor protection data goes to 1983 while the World Bank Doing Business 
indicators start only in 2003 and the World Economic Forum data goes back to 2000).2 
Macroeconomic control data was collected from the IMF and World Bank World Development 
Indicators, and had full country coverage over the timeframe specified.  
 
3.2 Data diagnostics and choice of estimator 
 
Econometric estimation of the model shown in Equation 1 must take into account the 
exigencies of the data, and with several dependent variables, a “one-size-fits-all” estimator is not 
possible. This is especially the case in regard to fundamental issues such as the presence of a unit root, 
which can create spurious or inconsistent regressions unless corrected for. Diagnostic tests on the data 
were conducted using the Levin Lin Chu (LLC) test for a common unit root and the Im, Pesaran, and 
Shin (IPS) test, Phillips-Perron (PP) test, and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to test for an 
individual unit root. Results shown in Table 1 below confirm that all our dependent variables are non-
stationary at their levels and are integrated at the order I(1). In regard to independent variables, the key 
explanator of foreign bank claims is also non-stationary, with other macroeconomic controls also 
appearing to exhibit a unit root. In particular, GDP per capita, tertiary enrollment, and a country’s 
surface area all are also integrated on the order of I(1).3 All other variables are stationary and 
integrated at I(0). 
 
Given these results, in order to provide consistent estimation, we are faced with either 
differencing the data or utilizing any number of cointegration methods. As differencing would likely 
wipe away much of the information that we are after, the choice of this article is to apply cointegration 
techniques to understand the long-run relationships between our variables and the business 
environment. As we need to establish cointegration amongst our non-stationary variables in order to 
use these techniques, however, I apply a full complement of cointegration tests, including the Pedroni 
                                                 
1 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting its inclusion. 
2 The countries included in the dataset are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. 
3 For GDP per capita, a “tie-breaker” was required, as two of four tests showed stationarity. To break the tie, 
the Breitung unit root test was performed, showing a Breitung p-value of 1.00 and confirming the non-
stationarity of GDP per capita. All variables containing a unit root were further tested and shown to be 
difference-stationary; results are omitted for sake of space but available from the author. 
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residual test, the Kao (1999) panel test, and the Fisher-Johansen test, to determine cointegration 
amongst the non-stationary variables. The full set of tests are shown in Appendix A for each 
dependent variable, but uniformly the Pedroni and Kao tests establish that cointegration exists among 
the non-stationary variables while the Fisher-Johansen test also strongly supports cointegration 
relationships among all of the included variables and for each dependent variable.   
 
These results allow us to use an ordinary least squares model corrected for the cointegrating 
vectors which, in this instance, will be the panel dynamic ordinary least square (PDOLS) model of 
Mark and Sul (2003). Our usage of PDOLS follows the approach of Brambila‐Macias and Massa 
(2010), Kakkar and Yan (2011), and Canale et.al (2014), as PDOLS has several traits to recommend it 
for the particular data amassed here. In the first instance, according to Mark and Sul (2003:655), 
PDOLS should “allow for individual heterogeneity through disparate short-run dynamics, individual-
specific fixed effects and individual-specific time trends.” Such an emphasis on fixed-effects is 
important for our data, as a Redundant Fixed-Effects Test in Eviews returned a p-value of 0.000 (chi-
square statistic of 341.59), confirming the significance of country fixed-effects in the specification. 
Additional tests on the joint significance of period and country fixed-effects returned a similar result, 
with a chi-square of 355.98 and a p-value of 0.000, showing that a within-estimator such as PDOLS is 
appropriate for our purposes.  
 
Furthermore, an added advantage of the PDOLS process as utilized here is that pre-whitening 
in the manner of Andrews and Monahan (1992), utilizing a Bartlett kernel and Newey-West automatic 
bandwidth for the long-run variance, results in standard errors which are robust to both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Finally, PDOLS as shown in Mark and Sul (2003) allows for 
some degree of cross-sectional dependence (Gnimassoun and Coulibaly 2014), but additional Pesaran 
(2004) tests across each model gave little evidence of cross-sectional dependence in the data.4 
 
 
4. Results 
 
The results of this empirical analysis are shown in Table 2 below. Across all specifications 
and, surprisingly, all metrics, the results are uniform: foreign bank presence aids in the improvement 
of all facets of business reform in transition, confirming the results of Hartwell and Michael (2015) on 
a larger sample of developed and developing countries. However, these effects take some time to work 
their way into the system, as the beneficial effects of foreign bank entry are often not seen until three 
years later or even five years later in a transition economy. In fact, it is only for the time to start a 
business, time to import, and cost of exporting goods that foreign bank presence has an immediate and 
significant effect, while for other metrics the effect is insignificant at its first lag. The inclusion of 
longer lags of foreign bank presence corrects this anomaly uniformly, once again pointing to the fact 
that bank entry can encourage a better business environment but that it may require several years to 
work its way into a country’s institutional structure. 
 
When correcting for this delay, against each dependent variable, the longer-term effects of 
foreign bank entry have a strong positive economic and statistical effect, with the strongest results in 
regard to a country’s competitiveness rank and the time it takes to start a business. For example, if a 
country were to double its stock of foreign bank claims at time t-3, this would correspond to an 
increase in its competitiveness ranking of approximately 4.73 places closer to the top. Similar results 
hold for each metric, with investor protection and time to export showing improvement at a longer lag 
(at least five-years) of foreign bank entry (prior to that, foreign bank entry has a beneficial impact but 
is insignificant). These results hold up in the presence of the full set of macroeconomic and country-
specific controls, which behave for the most part as expected: more trade leads to better trade 
administration through familiarity and much higher competitiveness while poor macroeconomics 
(such as inflation) creates difficulties in a business environments, on average. 
                                                 
4 The Pesaran test was chosen for its small sample properties, which characterizes most of the models 
described below. Results available from the author. 
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As a robustness test for these results, it is interesting to note the impact of other possible 
determinants that are specific to transition countries. In the first instance, accession to the EU was a 
goal for many of the countries in this sample, possibly shaping the course of a particular business 
environment as the country converged on EU standards. Conversely, some countries in our database 
were unlikely to ever achieve EU accession (Tajikistan or Azerbaijan), and thus it is plausible that 
their business environments pursued a more independent path. To account for this reality, a dummy 
variable was included that takes the value of 1 in the year a country entered the EU (and every year 
thereafter) and 0 if otherwise. Various leads and lags will be experimented with to account for 
preparation effects.  
 
The results of this test are shown in Table 3, and the addition of an EU dummy does not alter 
the basic time structure or magnitude of foreign bank influence; indeed, in many areas, it strengthens 
the relationship, as in the advance of foreign bank influence in cost to import from three years out to 
just one and the much higher reductions in costs of exporting. Moreover, the EU dummy itself is fairly 
insignificant in most specifications, although it appears that being an EU country means having lower 
investor protections on average and more red tape in starting a business, a plausible assumption given 
that countries preparing for EU accession had to adopt a large number of EU regulations and 
directives, ones which were likely much more onerous than a country that had no such aspirations. 
Perhaps reassuringly, the EU has succeeded in lowering trade costs for its members who also were 
transition economies, at least in terms of time and cost of exporting. 
 
As a final robustness test, perhaps it was not the economic conditions, EU accession, or 
presence of foreign banks that contributed to the improvement of the business environment in 
transition, but the transition process itself; that is, perhaps it was the package of reforms that these 
countries were undergoing as part of transition that were the prime movers of improving the 
investment climate. To test this possibility, we re-run the dynamic OLS regressions with an additional 
regressor, the EBRD’s indicator for “governance and enterprise restructuring,” as a proxy for a 
country’s overall enterprise sector reforms. This index, as with all EBRD indicators, is coded from 1 
to 4.33, with a 1 showing no change from communist times and a 4.33 showing convergence with 
Western European standards of corporate governance.  The results of including this indicator are 
shown in (streamlined) Table 4, and, while restructuring is incredibly important for business 
environment metrics, it does not vitiate the results of foreign bank entry. The only metric which is 
affected by the inclusion of the governance index is a slight reduction in effect and significance of 
foreign banks on the time needed to start a business, but the difference still remains significant at the 
5% level. In all other cases, the relationship between foreign bank entry and an improved business 
environment holds. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The results shown above confirm earlier work done in Hartwell and Michael (2015) on the 
effect of foreign bank entry on a country’s business environment, but extend the analysis for additional 
years and are much stronger than this earlier work. Focusing exclusively on transition economies, we 
find that foreign bank entry, especially if seen from a longer-run trend (3 years or more), contributes 
positively to various facets of a country’s business environment, including its competitiveness and the 
time it takes to trade. These results were robust to inclusion of various macroeconomic and country-
specific traits that could be plausibly hypothesized as having an effect on the business environment. 
 
The research that may follow from this article is also promising and varied but would likely 
continue to focus on understanding how policies, institutions, and macroeconomic conditions feed 
through to the overall business environment. Indeed, as noted throughout this article, the dearth of 
work explaining why a particular country has a longer time to start a business than another is an 
interesting omission from the political economy literature. With a longer time-series of various 
business environment metrics, and through the use of appropriate estimation techniques (including 
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accounting for possible endogeneity), such issues could be easily tackled, but only with a supporting 
theoretical framework. These results will then help to guide better policy in emerging markets and in 
developed economies. As shown in this preliminary analysis, there is already an obvious 
recommendation to encourage foreign financial institutions to enter a country, given their beneficial 
role in the business environment. 
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Table 1: Results of Unit Root Tests 
Variable 
LLC IPS PP ADF Order of 
Integration statistic p-value statistic 
p-
value statistic 
p-
value statistic 
p-
value 
Competitiveness Rank -0.90 0.195 -0.45 0.33 39.43 0.58 47.72 0.25 I(1) 
Investor Protection -5.22 0.000 0.60 0.72 26.78 0.87 34.73 0.53 I(1) 
Time to Start a Business -1.01 0.155 2.52 0.99 16.80 0.99 20.48 0.990 I(1) 
Time to Export -5.66 0.000 -0.58 0.28 42.00 0.11 35.48 0.31 I(1) 
Cost to Export (log) -6.76 0.000 0.90 0.82 69.64 0.00 36.31 0.72 I(1) 
Time to Import -7.57 0.000 -0.61 0.27 42.96 0.35 45.43 0.256 I(1) 
Cost to Import (log) -4.85 0.000 0.63 0.74 40.80 0.44 29.65 0.885 I(1) 
Foreign Bank Claims 1.26 0.895 0.90 0.82 65.69 0.01 45.51 0.328 I(1) 
Population (log) 8.30 1.000 -5.79 0.00 98.10 0.00 115.59 0.001 I(0) 
Surface area (log) -0.31 0.380 -0.57 0.29 5.03 0.54 8.26 0.220 I(1) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.75 0.227 -1.67 0.048 29.78 0.92 57.83 0.050 I(1) 
Resource rents as 
percentage of GDP (log) -4.78 0.000 -3.07 0.001 82.94 0.00 85.20 0.000 I(0) 
Polity IV -85.09 0.000 -25.97 0.000 50.40 0.03 323.44 0.000 I(0) 
Growth of General 
Government 
Expenditure 
-4.57 0.000 -6.31 0.00 93.52 0.00 115.57 0.000 I(0) 
Trade as percentage of 
GDP (log) -2.29 0.010 -4.02 0.00 75.17 0.00 83.18 0.000 I(0) 
Tertiary enrollment -0.71 0.239 0.69 0.76 11.51 1.00 42.34 0.456 I(1) 
Inflation (log) -553.59 0.000 -392.61 0.00 3005.82 0.00 1753.67 0.000 I(0) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 2: Effects of Foreign Bank Presence on the Business Environment, PDOLS Specification 
 Competitiveness Rank Investor Protection 
Time to 
Start a 
Business 
Time to 
Import Cost to Import (log) Time to Export 
Cost to 
Export (log) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Foreign Bank Claims  (-1) 4.23   -0.04   -4.89 -0.06 0.002   -0.01   -0.01 
  1.50   0.18   3.62*** 3.01*** 0.23   0.45   10.54*** 
Foreign Bank Claims  (-3)   -4.73           -0.04       
    2.21**           3.81***       
Foreign Bank Claims  (-5)       0.78           -0.08   
        5.74***           13.52***   
GDP per capita -13.52 -4.69 -1.70 -1.19 -21.12 -0.09 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.10 
  1.92* 0.93 4.28*** 3.38*** 6.10*** 2.31** 4.11** 1.99** 2.36** 3.02*** 5.98*** 
Population -62.29 -19.57 -68.58 -68.51 -297.88 36.32 -0.32 -2.76 1.17 -2.30 -1.69 
  0.38 0.12 5.48*** 5.55*** 2.23** 23.20*** 7.82*** 6.07*** 1.07 3.09*** 3.28*** 
Surface Area 10144.64 11311.73 163.48 127.03 9102.82 -198.12 -17.64 -39.72 78.55 105.01 -0.91 
  1.85* 2.06** 1.78* 1.41 5.97*** 9.38*** 0.74 1.72* 6.65*** 18.44*** 0.04 
Trade to GDP -42.88 -46.98 -0.34 -0.54 17.58 -0.31 -0.22 -0.35 -0.04 -0.13 -0.20 
  4.43*** 4.71*** 0.44 0.71 2.64** 4.25*** 9.66*** 11.96*** 0.77 4.50*** 7.88*** 
Government Growth 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.06 -0.21 -0.02 0.001 0.002 -0.005 -0.008 0.002 
  1.02 0.38 5.36*** 3.93*** 1.59 7.93*** 2.40** 3.11*** 3.31*** 8.25*** 3.25*** 
Resource Rents to GDP -3.42 -4.08 0.41 0.15 0.51 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 
  1.11 1.33 2.47** 0.88 0.24 4.86** 7.26*** 6.46*** 1.51 3.53*** 6.94*** 
Inflation -844.84 -368.35 20.03 20.18 7287.18 23.34 15.70 42.94 8.27 37.17 31.05 
  0.59 0.25 1.29 1.04 6.98** 1.85* 2.36** 5.64*** 0.92 7.15*** 5.58*** 
FDI Net Inflows 0.36 0.35 0.01 0.001 0.22 0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004 
  13.06*** 12.89*** 1.14 1.24 2.45** 1.46 6.38*** 3.84*** 0.66 2.09** 4.13*** 
Tertiary Enrollment -0.26 -0.25 0.001 -0.001 -0.02 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.0001 
  4.09*** 3.81*** 0.09 0.05 0.37 5.94*** 2.45** 4.03*** 1.53 3.34*** 2.13** 
Polity 0.67 0.68 0.005 0.005 -1.05 -0.02 0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.01 0.009 
  0.65 0.69 3.85*** 3.63*** 1.69 3.47*** 1.27 1.09 0.27 5.17*** 3.35*** 
n 241 241 261 250 216 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.80 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.97 
cointegrating trend linear linear linear and quadratic 
linear and 
quadratic linear linear 
linear and 
quadratic 
linear and 
quadratic linear linear 
linear and 
quadratic 
long-run variance 0.0004 0.0004 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.004 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.004 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
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Table 3 – Robustness Tests including EU Accession 
 
Competitiveness 
Rank Investor Protection 
Time to 
Start a 
Business 
Time to 
Import 
Cost to 
Import 
(log) 
Time to Export 
Cost to 
Export 
(log) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Foreign Bank Claims  (-1) 4.29   -0.13   -5.43 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02   -0.08 
  1.51   0.57   7.11*** 2.47** 2.99*** 1.47   7.85*** 
Foreign Bank Claims  (-3)   -4.54                 
    2.10**                 
Foreign Bank Claims  (-5)       0.63         -0.05   
        4.68***         6.17***   
EU dummy 1.1 0.90 -0.29 -0.31 3.60 -0.02 -0.005 -0.03 -0.03 -0.009 
  0.78 0.63 2.20** 2.43** 4.43*** 0.32 0.35 2.40** 2.56*** 2.78*** 
n 240 240 261 250 216 180 180 180 180 180 
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 
cointegrating trend linear linear 
linear 
and 
quadratic 
linear 
and 
quadratic 
linear 
and 
quadratic 
linear linear linear linear linear 
long-run variance 48.39 48.24 0.30 0.27 13.24 0.004 0.0007 0.001 0.001 0.005 
 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Macroeconomic controls 
are retained in the regressions but not shown in interests of space.  
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Table 4 – Robustness Tests including Enterprise Restructuring 
 
Competitiveness 
Rank Investor Protection 
Time to 
Start a 
Business 
Time to 
Import 
Cost to 
Import 
(log) 
Time to 
Export 
Cost to 
Export 
(log) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Foreign Bank Claims  (-1) 2.16   -0.47   -3.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 
  1.02   1.11   2.51** 2.55*** 4.64*** 4.77*** 3.75*** 
Foreign Bank Claims  (-3)   -5.43               
    2.40**               
Foreign Bank Claims  (-5)       0.63           
        4.64***           
EBRD governance and enterprise index 2.20 2.12 1.61 -0.06 -13.30 -0.005 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 
  1.11 0.73 3.72*** 0.26 9.48*** 0.15 4.01*** 0.31 2.95*** 
EU dummy 4.21 0.61 -0.36 -0.31 5.83 -0.006 -0.003 -0.10 -0.01 
  4.41*** 0.43 1.27 2.41** 8.41*** 0.13 0.15 2.93*** 2.08** 
n 240 240 261 250 216 180 180 180 180 
Adjusted R-squared 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.95 0.96 0.90 0.96 
cointegrating trend 
linear 
and 
quadratic 
linear 
linear 
and 
quadratic 
linear 
and 
quadratic 
linear 
and 
quadratic 
linear linear linear linear 
long-run variance 14.25 48.58 0.29 0.27 11.08 0.003 0.0007 0.02 0.0005 
 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Macroeconomic controls 
are retained in the regressions but not shown in interests of space. 
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APPENDIX A – Full Cointegration Test Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Competitiveness Rank 
Independent Variables: Foreign Bank Claims, GDP Per Capita, Tertiary School Enrollment 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
Common AR coefficients (within-dimension) 
 Weighted 
 Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Panel PP-
Statistic -1.430 0.076 -2.220 0.013 
Panel ADF-
Statistic -3.464 0.000 -4.281 0.000 
      
Individual AR coefficients (between-dimension)   
 Statistic p-value   
Group PP-
Statistic -4.180 0.000   
Group ADF-
Statistic -4.987 0.000   
 
 Kao Residual Test 
  t-Statistic Probability 
ADF -4.7518 0.000 
 
Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test 
Hypothesized 
number of 
CEs 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(trace) 
Probability 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(max 
eigen 
test) 
Probability 
None 269.50 0.000 233.00 0.000 
At most 1 225.30 0.000 154.90 0.000 
At most 2 122.70 0.000 93.13 0.000 
At most 3 77.76 0.000 77.76 0.000 
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Dependent Variable: Investor Protection 
Independent Variables: Foreign Bank Claims, GDP Per Capita, Tertiary School Enrollment 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
Common AR coefficients (within-dimension) 
 Weighted 
 Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Panel PP-
Statistic 
-2.376 0.009 -2.324 0.01 
Panel ADF-
Statistic 
-2.833 0.002 -1.827 0.03 
      
Individual AR coefficients (between-dimension)   
 Statistic p-value   
Group PP-
Statistic 
-4.286 0.0000 
  
Group ADF-
Statistic 
-3.669 0.0001 
  
 
 Kao Residual Test 
  t-Statistic Probability 
ADF -6.52 0.0000 
 
Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test 
Hypothesized 
number of 
CEs 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(trace) 
Probability 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(max 
eigen 
test) 
Probability 
None  214.30  0.0000  160.60  0.0000 
At most 1  215.20  0.0000  195.90  0.0000 
At most 2  160.00  0.0000  142.60  0.0000 
At most 3  89.08  0.0000  89.08  0.0000 
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Dependent Variable: Time to Start a Business 
Independent Variables: Foreign Bank Claims, GDP Per Capita, Tertiary School Enrollment 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
Common AR coefficients (within-dimension) 
  Weighted 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.999 0.000 -11.663 0.00 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.590 0.000 -5.820 0.00 
      
Individual AR coefficients (between-dimension)   
  Statistic p-value   
Group PP-Statistic -16.137 0.000   
Group ADF-Statistic -5.790 0.000   
      
 
       Kao Residual Test 
     t-Statistic Probability 
   ADF -4.878 0.000 
   
 
     Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test 
 
Hypothesized number of CEs 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(trace) 
Probability 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(max 
eigen 
test) 
Probability 
 None 168.60 0.000 114.70 0.000 
 At most 1 78.09 0.000 44.14 0.007 
 At most 2 55.84 0.000 45.11 0.006 
 At most 3 46.72 0.004 46.72 0.004 
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Dependent Variable: Time to Start a Business 
Independent Variables: Foreign Bank Claims, GDP Per Capita 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
Common AR coefficients (within-dimension) 
  Weighted 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.547 0.000 -6.247 0.00 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.285 0.001 -3.994 0.00 
      
Individual AR coefficients (between-dimension)   
  Statistic p-value   
Group PP-Statistic -9.527 0.000   
Group ADF-Statistic -4.451 0.000   
      
 
       Kao Residual Test 
     t-Statistic Probability 
   ADF -5.530 0.000 
   
 
     Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test 
 
Hypothesized number of CEs 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(trace) 
Probability 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(max 
eigen 
test) 
Probability 
 None 219.30 0.000 162.40 0.000 
 At most 1 110.30 0.000 90.42 0.000 
 At most 2 82.31 0.000 82.31 0.000 
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Dependent Variable: Cost of Importing 
Independent Variables: Foreign Bank Claims, GDP Per Capita 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
Common AR coefficients (within-dimension) 
  Weighted 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Panel PP-Statistic -6.636 0.000 -5.746 0.00 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.260 0.000 -3.967 0.00 
      
Individual AR coefficients (between-dimension)   
  Statistic p-value   
Group PP-Statistic -8.754 0.000   
Group ADF-Statistic -4.757 0.000   
      
 
       Kao Residual Test 
     t-Statistic Probability 
   ADF -5.341 0.000 
   
 
     Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test 
 
Hypothesized number of CEs 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(trace) 
Probability 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(max 
eigen 
test) 
Probability 
 None 196.60 0.000 131.60 0.000 
 At most 1 109.40 0.000 81.04 0.000 
 At most 2 101.10 0.000 101.10 0.000 
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Dependent Variable: Time to Export 
Independent Variables: Foreign Bank Claims, GDP Per Capita 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
Common AR coefficients (within-dimension) 
  Weighted 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Panel PP-Statistic -5.378 0.000 -6.415 0.00 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.774 0.000 -4.335 0.00 
      
Individual AR coefficients (between-dimension)   
  Statistic p-value   
Group PP-Statistic -8.506 0.000   
Group ADF-Statistic -5.682 0.000   
      
 
       Kao Residual Test 
     t-Statistic Probability 
   ADF -4.481 0.000 
   
 
     Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test 
 
Hypothesized number of CEs 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(trace) 
Probability 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(max 
eigen 
test) 
Probability 
 None 200.20 0.000 149.90 0.000 
 At most 1 103.60 0.000 82.46 0.000 
 At most 2 86.24 0.000 86.24 0.000 
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Dependent Variable: Cost of Export 
Independent Variables: Foreign Bank Claims, GDP Per Capita 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
Common AR coefficients (within-dimension) 
  Weighted 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Panel PP-Statistic -10.739 0.000 -10.082 0.00 
Panel ADF-Statistic -8.439 0.000 -7.113 0.00 
      
Individual AR coefficients (between-dimension)   
  Statistic p-value   
Group PP-Statistic -10.968 0.000   
Group ADF-Statistic -7.436 0.000   
      
 
       Kao Residual Test 
     t-Statistic Probability 
   ADF -5.182 0.000 
   
 
     Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test 
 
Hypothesized number of CEs 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(trace) 
Probability 
Fisher 
Statistic 
(max 
eigen 
test) 
Probability 
 None 210.00 0.000 140.30 0.000 
 At most 1 114.00 0.000 83.58 0.000 
 At most 2 106.60 0.000 106.60 0.000 
  
 
 
 
